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1 Derivation of the objective function of the Dynastic Problem
(DP)








(log +( 1−  − )log+1).
Proof. Applying recursive substitution to household utility we obtain
 = ( )++1
= ( )+ ((+1 +1)++2)
= ( )+(+1 +1)+
2 ((+2 +2)++3)


































 [log +( 1− )log+1 − log]
=( log0 +( 1− )log1 − log0)
+ (log1 +( 1− )log2 − log1)
+














 [log +( 1−  − )log+1]
2Since 0 is just a constant, the result holds.
When working with this functional form, we assume 1 −  − 0 to guarantee the strict concavity of the
objective.
2 Characterization of the competitive equilibrium
Next we characterize the Competitive Equilibrium as deﬁned in the main text.
Feasibility and market clearing conditions in the capital, labor, and land markets are given by









2 +( 1− ) (1)
1 + 2 =  (2)
1 + 2 =( 1 − ) (3)
Λ = Λ (4)
2.1 Dynastic Problem











   +1 ≥ 0 0 0 given












  +1 ≥ 0 0 0 given.
Rewriting per household variables in terms of the dynastic aggregates and multiplying the budget constraint
by  = 0
Q−1















subject to  + +1 =(  − +1) +(  +1− ) + Λ (5)
 +1 +1 ≥ 0 0 0 given1
2.1.1 Existence and uniqueness of the solution to (DP)
By construction, () is equivalent to (0)The constraint set of (0) is non-empty and compact and we
assume the objective function to be continuous. This guarantees existence of a solution. Since the constraint
set is also convex and we assume a strictly concave utility function, the solution is also unique.
2.1.2 Suﬃciency of ﬁrst order and transversality conditions
Next we argue that ﬁrst order and transversality conditions are suﬃcient to characterize the unique solution
to ().









+1 ∈ Γ() =1 2




(+1 +1) ∈ R2
+|0 ≤ +1 ≤ ( − +1) +(  +1− ) + Λ 0 ≤ +1 ≤ 
ª

Under the assumptions of continuity and strict concavity of , all the conditions of Theorem 4.15 in Stokey,
Lucas with Prescott are satisﬁed and hence the ﬁrst ordert and transversality conditions along with the
budget constraint can be used to characterize the solution. More precisely for a given 0 a sequence
{+1}
∞
=0 with +1 ∈ Γ() for all  solves (DP) if it satisﬁes ﬁrst order and transversality conditions.
Consumption then is determined from the budget constraint.
We use the ﬁrst order and transversality conditions for (0) to characterize the solution to the Dynastic
Planning Problem.
2.1.3 Derivation of ﬁrst order and transversality conditions























=  − +1+1
The ﬁrst two yield the Euler Equation,
1 ()




(+1 +1− ) (6)











1 ( +1 )
+1
2





















2 ( +1 )




Hence, the set of conditions describing the solution to the Dynastic Planning problem is given by (6) (7)























42.2 Firms maximization and optimal resource allocation
2.2.1 The Malthusian technology is always employed
Lemma 2 The Malthusian technology is always employed in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose the Malthusian ﬁrm produces 1 = .T h eﬁrm’s spending on land rent is




1Λ−− · Λ =( 1−  − )





















































which represents the demand for capital conditional on the scale of operation 1 = . The conditional






















The total cost of producing  units is therefore
∗
1 + ∗


































+( 1−  − )










































































 ( + )
For  small enough,  and  are approximately determined by the Solow sector alone, so they can be treated
as given. Since  + 1, ∃0 small enough that the above inequality holds. Hence, the Malthusian
technology is always used in equilibrium.

















52.2.2 Necessary condition for operating the Solow technology




















where the right hand side represents the unit cost of Solow output computed with all resources allocated to
the Malthusian sector.
Proof. First we derive the cost of producing  units of Solow output for some given factor prices? Proﬁt










2  and hence
factor prices determine the optimal input ratio, 
 = 2
(1−)2 This allows us to determine the optimal















































Now consider the following equilibrium outcome. For some arbitrary time , (13) holds, but Solow output
is zero. Then all inputs are allocated to the Malthusian sector and proﬁt maximization of the Malthusian








1 Λ1−−. Producing  units of Solow output




























w h e r ew eu s e d(13) It follows that the Solow sector fails to maximize proﬁts, which is a contradiction.
When the Solow sector operates, marginal products of capital and labor must equalize across sectors. Hence,









1Λ1−− = 2 ( − 1)






1 Λ1−− =( 1− )2 ( − 1)
 ( − 1)
−
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
if (13) holds, (14)
1 =  1 =  and 2 = 2 =0  otherwise.
2.3 Summary of conditions that characterize the competitive equilibrium
Proposition 4 Conditions (1)−(4)(6)−(12)(14)2 characterize (necessary and suﬃcient conditions for)
the solution to the competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Follows from the deﬁnition of the competitive equilibrium and from the above derivations.
The following proposition allows us to replace the transversality conditions by a simple check of the limiting
behavior of  and  of the candidate solution.
Proposition 5 If candidate equilibrium solution sequences of allocations and prices satisfy (1) − (4)(6)
(7) (10)−(12) (14)  is bounded away from 0 and  exhibits growth as  →∞ , then the transversality
conditions (8) and (9) are also satisﬁed.
2Note the budget constraint is implied.
6Proof. With our choice of the objective function, the transversality conditions for () are given by
lim
→∞
 ( +1− )





( − +1) +(  +1− ) + Λ − +1
 =0 
Consider the term inside the ﬁrst transversality condition
( +1− )
( − +1) +(  +1− ) + Λ − +1
 =
1 + 2 +( 1− )
 +( 1− ) − +1
Dividing the numerator and the denominator by the level of aggregate output gives
1 + 2 +( 1− )
1 − (+1 − (1 − ))
The term +1−(1−) represents aggregate investment and −(+1 − (1 − )) represents aggregate
consumption. Notice that there are two ways to violate this T.V.C. Either the numerator goes to ∞ fast
enough or the denominator goes to zero fast enough (or both). Clearly, the numerator cannot go to ∞
since 1 ∈ [01], 2 ∈ [01],a n d(1 − ) →∞is impossible (Indeed, suppose (1 − ) →
∞ then  →∞and ∃∗ such that ∀ ∗ +1 −  =  −   0 This in turn implies
that  is shrinking which violates our assumption). The only way the T.V.C. can be violated is when
1 − (+1 − (1 − )) → 0 fast enough, which means that 
 goes to zero and again violates our
assumption. The argument for the second T.V.C. is similar.
Notice that any balanced growth behavior of the equilibrium time paths such that  is constant guar-
antees that transversality conditions hold.
3 Sequential Problem (SP) whose solution corresponds to the
competitive equilibrium allocation
3.1 Deﬁnition
We next deﬁne a sequential problem whose solution is the competitive equilibrium allocation. This sequential
problem (SP) compactly states the optimization problem at hand and illustrates the sense in which the
competitive equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient. There are diﬃculties associated with deﬁning eﬃciency in
models with endogenous fertility. The (SP) deﬁned here corresponds to the A-eﬃciency concept as deﬁned
by Golosov, Jones, Tertilt (2006). According to this concept, when comparisons are made across allocations,
the positive weight is put only on those households that are alive in all possible allocations. Analyzing
concepts of eﬃciency in models of endogenous fertility, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
We emphasize that proving equivalence of the competitive equilibrium allocation to the solution of this
problem is not necessary for any of the results in the main text. To solve the model, it is enough to















subject to  + +1 =  ( ;)+( 1− ) (15)
 =  − +1
 +1 +1  0, 0 0 are given and







1Λ1−− + 2 ( − 1)




subject to 0 ≤ 1 ≤  0 ≤ 1 ≤ 
73.1.1 Existence and uniqueness of solution to (SP)
Continuity of the objective function in (SP), together with the compactness and non-emptiness of the con-
straint set, guarantees existence of a solution. We assume strict concavity of  which guarantees that the
objective function is strictly concave. Since the constraint set is convex, the solution is unique.
3.1.2 Suﬃciency of ﬁrst order and transversality conditions
Next we argue that ﬁrst order and transversality conditions are suﬃcient to characterize the unique solution
to (SP). We follow the lines of the argument put forth for the dynastic problem, except that now
Γ( )=
©
(+1 +1) ∈ R2
+|0 ≤ +1 ≤  (  − +1)+( 1− ) 0 ≤ +1 ≤ 
ª
The set Γ( ) is illustrated graphically in Figure 1. Notice that the frontier of the set is given by









22 (  − +1)  0






(1 ) t K  
(,)( 1 ) tt t FK N K  
Figure 1. Constraint Set at time 
Under the assumptions of continuity and strict concavity of , all the conditions of Theorem 4.15 in Stokey,
Lucas with Prescott are satisﬁed. Given 0 a sequence {+1}
∞
=0 with +1 ∈ Γ() for all  solves
(DP) if it satisﬁes ﬁrst order and transversality conditions. Consumption then is determined from (15) while
Kuhn-Tucker conditions determine optimal resource allocation.
3.1.3 Derivation of ﬁrst order and transversality conditions
























= 2 (  − +1;) − +12 (+1 +1 − +1+2; +1 )
8The ﬁrst two conditions yield
1 ()




(1 (+1 +1 − +1+2; +1 )+1− ) (17)











1 ( +1 )
+1
2
























2 ( +1 )
1 ( +1 )
+2
+1
− 2 (+1 +1 − +1+2; +1 ) (18)























T h es t a t i cm a x i m i z a t i o np r o b l e m(16) determines the optimal resource allocation between the two technolo-
gies. In the following Lemma we show that the Malthusian output is always strictly positive (1 1  0 ∀).
3.1.4 Optimal resource allocation
Lemma 6 In any solution to the Sequential Problem, the Malthusian technology operates for all  as long
as   1  0.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there is time  such that 1 =0  Since resources are allocated








1Λ1−− + 2 ( − 1)











 Λ1−− + 2 ((1 − ))















 Λ1−−.S i n c e lim→0
1
1−− = ∞ and the right hand
side is a ﬁnite number, ∃0 that ensures (20) is satisﬁed. Hence, we arrive at contradiction with (19).
Next we derive conditions that characterize the solution to (16). To ease notation, denote −+1 by 
and ignore the time subscript since this maximization problem is static. The only possible corner solution
here is the Solow technology not being used.





1Λ1−− − 2 ( − 1)
−1 ( − 1)
1− ≥ 0





1 Λ1−− − (1 − )2 ( − 1)
 ( − 1)
− ≥ 0
= if 1  
9When the Solow technology operates,
2 ( − 1)
−1 ( − 1)
1−
(1 − )2 ( − 1)











































1Λ1−− − 2 ( − 1)



























Given  and , the optimal resource allocation can be summarized as follows









1Λ1−− = 2 ( − 1)






1 Λ1−− =( 1− )2 ( − 1)
 ( − 1)
−
otherwise.
Since some resources are always allocated to the Malthusian technology, we use










in (17) and (18).
3.1.5 Equivalence
Proposition 7 The competitive equilibrium in the decentralized economy corresponds to the solution of (SP).
Proof. Conditions suﬃcient to determine the unique competitive equilibrium allocation coincide with suf-
ﬁcient conditions for the unique solution to (SP). Hence, the result follows.
4 Limiting behavior of the equilibrium time paths
Our goal here is to understand how the behavior of the solution to the model depends on the choice of the
parameters and the initial conditions. Denote the choice of the parameters (Λ 10 20   1 2  
    ) by ˆ  ∈ Θ,w h e r eΘ denotes the set of all admissible parameter choices.
We can identify three possible types of limiting behavior of the equilibrium time paths: (1) The solution
exhibits the property that the level of output in both sectors converges to some constant positive fraction of
total output, (2) The solution exhibits the property that the level of output in the Solow sector converges
to 0, (3) The solution exhibits the property that the level of output in the Malthusian sector relative to
10the total output converges to 0. We refer to these types of limiting behavior of equilibrium time paths as
convergence to Malthus-Solow Balanced Growth Path (BGP), Malthus BGP and Solow BGP respectively.
There are possibly other types of behavior of equilibrium time paths but we do not attempt to describe those
here.
Deﬁne the following sets of parameter and initial condition values that generate one of the three types of


















































The objective is to describe 1 2 and 3 as best we can. We can also identify two subsets of 1 and 2























ˆ  ∈ Θ (0 0) ∈ R2







If the parameter values and initial conditions lie in ∗
1, then the equilibrium time paths are on a Malthus-
Solow BGP starting in period 0. Similarly, if the parameter values and initial conditions lie in ∗
2, then the
equilibrium time paths are on a Malthus BGP starting in period 0. Note that a similar subset does not exist
in 3 because the Malthusian technology always operates as we proved in Lemmas 2 and 5.
4.1 Propositions summarizing how the behavior of equilibrium time paths de-
pends on the choice of parameters and initial conditions
We show in detail derivations upon which the results that we present here rest and summarize these as
lemmas and propositions. We summarize our ﬁndings regarding the dependence of the solution behavior on
the choice of parameters and conditions. We discuss our results and illustrate a stylized segmentation of the
parameter and initial condition space into diﬀerent types of limiting equilibrium behavior. Our discussion
will contrast the result obtained by Hansen and Prescott (2003). In that work, as long as the growth rate
of the Solow TFP is positive, all equilibria exhibit convergence to a Solow BGP. In our model, however,
the limiting behavior of equilibrium time paths is determined by the particular parameterization and initial
conditions.
4.1.1 Derivation and discussion of Malthus-Solow balanced growth properties
Next we derive the properties of the limiting behavior of equilibrium time paths in 1 We consider equilibrium
paths along which all variables grow at constant rates, although not necessarily the same, and the relative
output of the two sectors remains constant. The constancy of the growth rates allows us to simplify the
relevant equilibrium conditions and arrive at equilibrium growth rates of such a solution as functions of
parameters.
Proposition 8 If there is a solution {   1  1}
∞
=0 such that all variables grow at constant rates
∀,s a y11  0 and 1 ≡  ∈ (01) then the following is true.
11(1)  =  = 1 =  = 1 ≡ 
(2) The unknowns    1    (where  = 
  = 1
   =
1


















[ +1− ] (25)


















(1 − 1 − )
 (28)
 +  =


+( 1− ) (29)








































 − ¯ 
 +1−  − 
´  0 (31)






 ¯  (32)
0  ¯ 1 ≡

(1 − )
¯ 1  1 −  (33)
¯  ≡

























 − (1 − )

(4) Initial conditions (0 0) generating such a solution correspond to
¡¯  ¯ 
¢

3There is a unique analytical solution to this system of equations, which is derived in the proof.







(+1 +1− ) (36)

















2 ( − 1)
−1 (1 − 1 − )












2 ( − 1)
 (1 − 1 − )
− =  (39)











2 ( − 1)
 (1 − 1 − )1− +( 1− ) (40)
where  =
+1
 and (38) and (39) represent equality of factor marginal products across the two sectors.
Denote the constant rate of growth of per capita consumption by  and the constant growth rate of population





on a BGP, we see that  must remain constant, so we replace it by  Then constancy of  together with










grows at the same rate as 1
while 2 = 20
2 ( − 1)
 (1 − 1 − )1− grows at the same rate as ( − 1).S i n c e 2 grows at a
constant rate by assumption, it means that  and 1 grow at the same rate, hence  = 1 must stay
constant. Once again considering the deﬁnition of  in (38)  20
2 ( − 1)
−1 (1 − 1 − )
1− = ,w e
observe that since  −1 grows at a constant rate, 1−1 − must also grow at a constant rate, and since
 and 1 are both constants, it implies that 1 must also stay constant, denote it by 1.
Next we show that  and  must grow at the same constant rate. Consider (40) rewritten using the
deﬁnition of  from (38)































The right hand side is a constant, hence, the left hand side must also remain constant, denote it by  = 
.
This means that indeed  and  grow at the same rate . Considering our previous results, this means that
1 and 2 also grow at the rate of .D e ﬁne the fraction  =
1
 
We can ﬁnd  by once again using the deﬁnition of  in (38) and its constancy,
20
2 ( − )

















,w eﬁnd the relationship between  and 
1 = 1−−1− (42)
13These last two equations, (41) and (42) pin down the growth rate of per capita variables  and the population





















































This allows us to rewrite (37) as follows,














































(1 − 1 − )

Finally, we rewrite the feasibility condition (40) as
 + +1 =  +( 1− )












Hence, we proved results (1) and (2) of the lemma.
In fact, we can ﬁnd the solution to (23)−(29) analytically. The ﬁrst two equations give  and  in terms of




− (1 − )














(1 − 1 − )


(1 − )+ − 
=
(1 − )1
(1 − 1 − )

1 =
 (1 − )
(1 − )(1 − )+
 (44)




− +( 1− ) (45)
Finally, substituting from (45) and (44) into (26) gives





 − +( 1− )
´

 (1 − )





(1 −  − )
























((1 − ) − )+
(1−−)
 (1 − )( − )

We already derived  in terms of parameter values, hence, the above gives the analytical solution for 
along a MS BGP. We can then back out the rest of the variables using (43)(44) and (45)
Recall that equations (36) − (40) characterize the equilibrium with both technologies operating. Rewriting





















































































































Whenever the original variables exhibit Mathus-Solow balanced growth, the eﬃciency variables are in steady
state. This is true by construction of eﬃciency variables (that utilized information on  and  along a
15Malthus-Solow BGP). It is possible to solve for the steady state values of eﬃciency variables, which we
denote by a bar, analytically. The solution is obtained by solving
 =  [¯  +1− ] (46)
(1 −  − )¯ 

=  ¯  −
¯ 







¡¯  − ¯ 1
¢−1 ¡
1 − ¯ 1 − 





1 +−1 =( 1 − )20
¡¯  − ¯ 1
¢ ¡
1 − ¯ 1 − 
¢− =¯  (49)




1 ¯ +−1 + 20
¡¯  − ¯ 1
¢ ¡
1 − ¯ 1 − 
¢1− +( 1− )¯  (50)






1 − ¯ 1 − 
¢
(1 − )
¡¯  − ¯ 1
¢
so the system of steady state equations can be rewritten as







1 ¯ +−1 =¯ 
(1 − )¯ 1




1 − ¯ 1 − 
¢¯ 1
 ¯ 




¯  +1− 
¶




1 ¯ +−1 + 20
¡¯  − ¯ 1
¢ ¡
1 − ¯ 1 − 
¢1− +( 1− )¯ 
(1 − )20
¡¯  − ¯ 1
¢ ¡
1 − ¯ 1 − 
¢− =¯ 
20
¡¯  − ¯ 1
¢−1 ¡
1 − ¯ 1 − 
¢1− =¯ 





¯ 1 and from the last equation




























From the last equation we solve for
¡







1− ¡¯  − ¯ 1
¢
. If we substitute for ¯ 1 in terms of










































 − (1 − )












16Substituting for ¯  =
¯ ¯ 1
¯ 1 , ¯ 1 and ¯ 1 in feasibility, we obtain a linear equation with one unknown ¯ 
 ¯ 




¯  +1− 
¶




1 ¯ +−1 + 20
¡¯  − ¯ 1
¢ ¡
1 − ¯ 1 − 
¢1− +( 1− )¯ ,























¯  − 
³
1−
 − ¯ 
´´









¯  +1− 
¶
(1 − )¯ 

+
















 +1−  − 
¸





1 ¯ +−1 =¯ 












By construction of eﬃciency variables and given the fact that the original solution considered in this propo-
sition exhibits Malthus-Solow behavior from period 0 and onward, we have that the steady state values of
eﬃciency variables correspond to the values of original variables in time period 0. In particular, initial condi-
tions (0 0) correspond to (¯  ¯ ) Furthermore, because the original solution satisﬁes certain restrictions,
in particular, 0  0 0  0 0  10  0 0  10  1 − 0 0  0 0  0 it follows that (30) − (35)
must hold.
Note that the above proposition implies that for a given set of parameter values, ˆ  there exists at most one
pair (0 0) such that ˆ  (0 0) ∈ ∗
1.
Proposition 9 If a given ˆ  satisﬁes (30) − (35) then (0 0)=( ¯  ¯ ) generates the solution exhibiting
Malthus-Solow behavior from period 0 and onward.
Proof. The assumption is that an admissible solution to the steady state values of eﬃciency variables exists.
The claim is that ˆ (¯  ¯ ) ∈ ∗
1
We start the economy at (0 0)=( ¯  ¯ ). Consider a candidate solution consisting of sequences { =¯ 
 = ¯   = ¯  1 = ¯ 1  = }∞
=0 We will show that this candidate solution satisﬁes all the suﬃcient
equilibrium conditions (See Proposition 5) and exhibits the Malthus-Solow property. In light of deﬁnitions
of eﬃciency variables, the proposed sequences satisfy equations (36)−(40) ∀ This proposed solution is such
that original variables grow at Malthus-Solow BGP growth rates (determined by (23) − (29))a n de ﬃciency


















¡¯  − ¯ 1
¢ ¡
1 − − ¯ 1
¢1−
is constant ∀, i.e. ˆ (0 = ¯ 0 = ¯ ) ∈ ∗
1
Note that the candidate solution satisﬁes the assumptions of Proposition 5, hence, transversality conditions
(8) and (9) also hold.



















In what follows we show that this inequality is implied by (30) − (35)

















; these two conditions are given by








Λ1−−¯ − (1 − )
+−1 ¯ +−1










Clearly, [ Ineq 2] holds with equality because of (23) − (24)



































































Using (27) and (28) we have























































and supposing    gives 1 −   1 −  a contradiction.




1− (it is then necessary that  )t h e n(55) implies 1
1  2
2 and hence 0    1
1−  1












1− then (55) implies 1
1  2
2 and hence 1    1
1−  0 according to (57) Then we
either have or  .
Case 2.a.  and hence, 0 − 1 −  − 1.T h e n(56) holds.




1− we have −−  0 i.e. 
³
1 −  − 

´
 0 but 
  1 so we cannot have 1−−0.








Hence, [ Ineq 1] holds. We showed that suﬃcient conditions for the competitive equilibrium are all
satisﬁed and that the equilibrium paths exhibit MS BGP behavior from period 0 and onward.
Corollary 10 (to Propositions 8 and 9)
Part 1. Given an admissable solution  1    (   0 0  1  1 −  1 − 1 −   0
0    1)to the system of equations (23) − (29) the following quantities,





−1 1 − 1 − 
1 − 











satisfy (30) − (35)4
Part 2. Given admissable steady state eﬃciency variables ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ 1¯ 1 ¯  (satisfying (30)−(35)) with  and
























¡¯  − ¯ 1
¢ ¡
1 − − ¯ 1
¢1−
 = 20
¡¯  − ¯ 1
¢−1 (1 − − 1)
1−
solve (25) − (29)5
Proof. It is straight-forward to verify this.
Proposition 11 (Part1) If ˆ  ∈ Θ satisﬁes (30) − (35) then there exists at least 1 pair (0 0) such that
ˆ (0 0) ∈ 1 (Part 2) If ˆ (0 0) ∈ 1 then ˆ  ∈ Θ satisﬁes (30) − (35)
Before proving this proposition, we say a few words about the statement. Part 1 states that for a set of
parameters satisfying (30) − (35) it is possible to ﬁnd initial conditions such that equilibrium time paths
exhibit Malthus-Solow BGP behavior in the limit. For most ˆ  satisfying (30) − (35) that we worked with,
there exists a continuum of pairs (0 0) such that ˆ  (0 0) ∈ 1. Identifying these, however, requires
stability analysis, which cannot be performed analytically for this dynamical system. As discussed in the
main text, when calibrating the model economy, we restrict our attention to ∗
1, i.e., we start the economy
on a Malthus-Solow BGP. We then show numerically that this BGP is locally stable. This means that there
is a continuum of initial conditions (0 0) that generate Malthus-Solow BGP behavior in the limit.
Part 2 of this proposition states that if equilibrium paths exhibit Malthus-Solow BGP behavior in the limit,
then parameters must satisfy (30) − (35)
Proof.
(of Part 1) Implied by Proposition 9. The solution generated by (0 0)=( ¯  ¯ ) delivers Malthus-Solow
BGP behavior from period 0 and onward, and hence, it gives Malthus-Solow BGP behavior in the limit.
( o fP a r t2 )I fˆ (0 0) ∈ 1 then for  large enough, the economy approximately exhibits properties of a
Malthus-Solow BGP, i.e. equations (23)−(29) have an admissible solution    1    (where  = 

4These quantities represent steady state eﬃciency variables.
5These quantities characterize Malthus-Solow balanced growth path behavior.
19 = 1
   =
1
 ). This implies that the steady state levels of the corresponding eﬃciency variables (deﬁned
in the statement of Proposition 8) also have an admissible solution, backed out as follows (see Corollary 10),





−1 1 − 1 − 
1 − 











Since 0 0  1  1 −  1 − 1 −   0 0    1 we have that ˆ  ∈ Θ satisﬁes (30) − (35)
4.1.2 Existence of Malthus-Solow balanced growth
Here, we show that the Malthus-Solow (MS) BGP exists for a set of parameter values and initial conditions
of positive measure. This is done in two steps.
(1) We ﬁrst show that the Malthus-Solow BGP implied by the calibration is locally structurally stable. In
other words, for suﬃciently small changes in the calibrated parameter values, the limiting behavior of the
solution is of Malthus-Solow type; i.e. it remains qualitatively unchanged. Starting with the calibrated
parameter values, we perturb each parameter, to slightly larger and smaller values, while holding the rest of
the parameters ﬁxed. Table 1 reports the results for the original calibration and the results obtained with
18 diﬀerent parameter calibrations (2 perturbations of each of the 9 parameters that enter the MS BGP
equations). For each of these parameter combinations, a MS BGP exists. We show this by analytically
ﬁnding an admissible solution to the system of the MS BGP equations 91-97. Note that the solution is
admissible if
0   1 − 1 −   1
The three ﬁgures illustrate that for each parameter combination there is a solution that is admissible; i.e.
  and 1 − 1 −  fall within the appropriate range of (01).
T h u s ,w eh a v ee ﬀectively shown that there are no restrictions on the relationship between the parameter
values needed to ensure the existence of an admissible solution to the MS BGP equations. Also note that
because we ﬁnd these solutions analytically and they are quantitatively diﬀerent, precision here is not an
issue; i.e., it is not the case that we are ﬁnding the original solution merely with less precision.
(2) Second, we show that each of the resulting MS BGPs (from Table 1) is locally Lyapunov stable. In other
words, small changes in the initial conditions of the convergent paths do not cause a change in the limiting
behavior of the equilibrium path. We show this by numerically log-linearizing the system of detrended
variables and obtaining the eigenvalues (in Matlab): exactly two eigenvalues are less than 1 in each case,
which is what is the necessary and suﬃcient condition for local stability of a dynamical system with two
state variables ( and ). The eigenvalues are reported in Table 2.
We have also conﬁrmed these results through extensive numerical testing: For small enough changes in
the calibrated parameter values, the asymptotic path of the solution to the model remains qualitatively
unchanged (both sectors operate forever), although of course the solution changes quantitatively. For small































1 3 5 7 9 1 11 31 51 71 9
1‐qn‐l1
20Table 1: The ﬁrst row reports the result for our calibration. The other 18 rows report the results associated
with perturbations of each parameter value, up and down, by .044 percent. For each parameter combination,
the (analytical) solution exists and it is admissible (See Figures 1,2, and 3 below).
Parameters Unknowns (Endogenous Moments
of the Malthus-Solow BGP)
 1 2             1
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0972 2.3884 0.438 14.1 0.67 0.348
0.7229 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0972 2.3888 0.438 14.1 0.67 0.348
0.7226 1.0422 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0986 2.3917 0.833 19.7 0.93 0.525
0.7226 1.0417 1.0067 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0092 1.0956 2.386 0.131 9.76 0.28 0.13
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5375 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0973 2.3886 0.454 14.33 0.68 0.357
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10452 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0973 2.3885 0.441 14.14 0.67 0.35
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2728 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0972 2.3884 0.436 14.08 0.67 0.347
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.582 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0972 2.3884 0.759 18.63 0.89 0.498
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4153 0.3828 1.0086 1.0972 2.3873 0.507 15.07 0.73 0.386
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3829 1.0086 1.0972 2.3884 0.559 15.81 0.77 0.411
0.7223 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0972 2.3881 0.437 14.1 0.67 0.348
0.7226 1.0413 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0959 2.3852 0.178 10.43 0.36 0.171
0.7226 1.0417 1.0058 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0079 1.0989 2.3909 0.956 21.44 0.98 0.566
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5371 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0972 2.3883 0.421 13.87 0.66 0.339
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10443 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0972 2.3884 0.434 14.05 0.67 0.346
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2726 0.5818 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0972 2.3885 0.439 14.12 0.67 0.349
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.5815 0.4151 0.3828 1.0086 1.0972 2.3884 0.242 11.34 0.45 0.221
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4149 0.3828 1.0086 1.0972 2.3896 0.381 13.3 0.62 0.315
0.7226 1.0417 1.0062 0.5373 0.10448 0.2727 0.5818 0.4151 0.3826 1.0086 1.0972 2.3884 0.333 12.63 0.57 0.285
4.1.3 Comparative statics results for the Malthus-Solow BGP
Note that on a Malthus-Solow BGP, both, population growth and per capita output growth, are determined














The growth rate of per capita output increases in the Solow TFP and is independent of the Malthusian TFP.
Population growth increases in the Malthusian TFP growth rate and decreases in the Solow TFP growth
rate. Interestingly, the time cost of raising children does not enter these two equations. This means that
increasing the probability of survival while keeping all other parameters ﬁxed would directly result in the
proportional reduction of fertility ( = ) For this class of simulations, i.e. in which we raise  and in
which both the original and limiting behavior of equilibrium paths exhibits Malthus-Solow BGP properties,
we found that during the transition from the original to the new balanced growth path, population growth
exhibits a hump, and that this transition is lengthy. Therefore, it is misleading to conclude from these
comparative statics exercises that mortality changes do not aﬀect population growth.
It is important to notice that this analysis is only valid as long as the new value of  does not alter the
type of limiting behavior of equilibrium paths, i.e., as long as it does not preclude convergence to a new
Malthus-Solow BGP. In fact, in the simulation results of the benchmark economy that are presented in the
main text, both of the exogenous changes (one is changes in 1 and 2 and one is changes in )t h a ta r ef e d
into the model imply that the economy converges to a Solow BGP.
6This result comes from the constancy of the interest rate on any balanced growth path and equality of the marginal products
of capital in the two sectors. Hence, it is robust to the choice of the objective function.
21Table 2: This table reports the eigenvalues for the log-linearized dynamical system of the detrended variables,
parameterized according to the corresponding row of Table 1.
Eigenvalues of the Log-Linearized
System of the dynamical system
written in term of detrended vari-
ables
Non-stable Stable Zero
8.159 2.416 0.997 0.295 0 0
8.159 2.416 0.997 0.295 0 1E-15
8.155 2.421 0.995 0.295 0 1E-15
8.163 2.411 0.999 0.295 1E-15 1E-15
8.158 2.417 0.997 0.295 0 0
8.159 2.416 0.997 0.295 0 0
8.155 2.416 0.997 0.295 0 0
8.155 2.419 0.996 0.295 0 1E-15
8.154 2.416 0.997 0.295 1E-15 1E-15
8.157 2.418 0.996 0.295 1E-15 1E-15
8.158 2.416 0.997 0.295 0 0
8.162 2.412 0.999 0.295 0 0
8.153 2.422 0.994 0.295 0 1E-15
8.159 2.416 0.997 0.295 0 1E-15
8.159 2.416 0.997 0.295 0 0
8.162 2.416 0.997 0.295 0 1E-15
8.161 2.414 0.998 0.295 0 0
8.163 2.417 0.997 0.295 0 0
8.16 2.415 0.998 0.295 0 0
4.1.4 Derivation and discussion of Malthusian balanced growth properties
Next we derive the properties of the limiting behavior of equilibrium time paths in 2 Here we consider
equilibrium paths along which all variables grow at constant rates, although not necessarily the same, and the
Solow sector does not operate. The constancy of the growth rates allows us to simplify relevant equilibrium
conditions and arrive at equilibrium growth rates of such a solution as functions of parameters.
Proposition 12 If there is a solution {   }
∞
=0 such that all variables grow at constant rates ∀,
say  and the Solow sector never operates ( 2 =0∀), then the following is true.
(1)  =  =  ≡ 
(2) The unknowns  (where  = 
) are determined by the following system of equations,
1−1 = 1−− (59)
 =  ( +1− ) (60)






 +  =


+( 1− ) (62)











with  and  given by (59) − (62) are in steady state for all  (which we denote by a bar), ¯ ¯  ¯ 0 and
22satisfy (63) − (66) [M Ineq 1] and [M Ineq 2] given below,
1−1 = 1−− (63)
 = 
"










1 −  − 

¶













+( 1− )¯  (66)










Λ1−−¯ − (1 − )
+−1 ¯ +−1










(4) Initial conditions (0 0) generating such a solution correspond to (¯  ¯ )
Proof. The solution considered here (such that the Solow technology is never operated, i.e., 1 =  and






(+1 +1− ) (67)






 + +1 = 10
1






























 and the following inequality stating that the unit cost in the Solow sector is greater than



































From the ﬁrst equation, which becomes  =

 [+1 +1− ] on a BGP, we see that  must remain constant,










grows at the same rate as ,s o = 
Next we want to show that  and  must grow at the same constant rate. Consider (69) rewritten using
the deﬁnition of  from (70)













23The right hand side is a constant, hence, the left hand side must also remain constant, denote it by  = 

So,  and  must grow at the same rate too. Hence, we have ,  =  =  ≡ .W eu s e(70) together
with the constancy of  once again to pin down the relationship between  and ,
1−1 = 1−−
Output can be rewritten as
1



















 (1 − )

.












Hence, we get a system of four equations (59) − (62) in four unknowns () that describes properties
of a Malthus BGP. So far, we proved results (1) and (2) of the proposition.






































































































Whenever the original variables are on a Malthus BGP, the eﬃciency variables are in steady state. This is
true by construction of eﬃciency variables (that utilized information on  and  along a Malthus BGP).
Hence, the above system must hold when we replace eﬃciency variables by their constant steady state values,
denoted by a bar. The above equations simplify to (64) − (66) Equation (63) holds because (59) holds (as
already shown) on a Malthus BGP. We also have that ¯ ¯  ¯  correspond to 0 0 and 0 respectively. Since
the original variables, 0 0 and 0 are positive, we have also have ¯ ¯  ¯ 0
By optimal resource allocation condition (14) we have that inequality (72) must also hold ∀. Substituting
from the equilibrium condition,  =( 1 − ) and from  = ¯   = ¯  ¯  ()
  1 = 10
1
2 = 20















¯  ¯  ()

´(−1)+(1−) ¡
(1 − ) ¯ ¢+(−1)(1−)  (73)
For this inequality to hold for all  it must hold for  =0and the growth rate of the denominator of the right












Λ1−− ¡¯  ¯ 
¢(−1)+(1−) ¡
(1 − ) ¯ 
¢+(−1)(1−) 
2 ≤ 1 ()
(−1)+(1−) +(−1)(1−)
which simplify to exactly [ Ineq 1] and [ Ineq 2].
24Proposition 13 If ˆ  ∈ Θ is such that for some arbitrary ¯ 0 the system of equations (63) − (66) has a
solution   ¯  ¯  such that ¯ ¯ 0, [ Ineq 1] and [ Ineq 2] are satisﬁed, then (0 0)=
¡¯  ¯ 
¢
generates the solution exhibiting Malthusian balanced growth behavior from period 0 and onward.
Proof. This proposition assumes that ˆ  is such that for some arbitrary ¯ , an admissible solution to the
steady state values of eﬃciency variables that correspond to a Malthus BGP exists and both [ Ineq 1] and
[ Ineq 2] hold. We want to show that ˆ 




We start the economy oﬀ at 0 = ¯  and 0 = ¯  Consider sequences
©
 = ¯   =¯   = ¯ ª∞
=0
as a candidate solution. We will show that this proposed solution satisﬁes all suﬃcient conditions for an
equilibrium exhibiting Malthus BGP properties. This solution satisﬁes equations (67) − (71) ∀.S i n c et h e
assumptions of Proposition 5 hold, the transversality conditions (8) and (9) also hold. Because [ Ineq 1]
and [ Ineq 2] are satisﬁe d ,w eh a v et h a ti n e q u a l i t y(73) holds ∀. Substituting  = ¯   = ¯  ¯  ()
 
1 = 10
1 2 = 20
2 into this inequality gives (72) ∀ that is, the Solow technology is never used.
Hence, the proposed solution,
©
 = ¯   =¯   = ¯ ª∞
=0  satisﬁes conditions suﬃcient to be the
equilibrium solution. Hence, ˆ (0 = ¯ 0 = ¯ ) ∈ ∗
2.
Corollary 14 (to Propositions 12 and 13)
Suppose there is a solution {   }
∞
=0 such that all variables grow at constant rates ∀ and the Solow
sector never operates ( 2 =0∀). Then given the solution  to (59) − (62) we have that 









and ¯  = ¯  solve (63) − (66) and satisfy [ Ineq 1] and
[ Ineq 2]7 Conversely, given a solution   ¯  ¯  ¯  to (63) − (66) such that [ Ineq 1] and [ Ineq 2]
are satisﬁed, we have    = ¯ 




solve (59) − (62)
Proof. Straight-forward to verify.
Proposition 15 (Part 1) If ˆ  ∈ Θ is such that for some arbitrary ¯ 0 the following system of equations
(63) − (66) has a solution   ¯  ¯  ¯  such that ¯ ¯ 0, [ Ineq 1] and [ Ineq 2] are satisﬁed, then
there exists at least one 0 such that ˆ 
¡
0 0 = ¯ 
¢
∈ 2 (Part 2) If ˆ (0 0) ∈ 2 then the system of
equations (63)−(66) has a solution   ¯  ¯  ¯  such that ¯ ¯ 0 and [ Ineq 1] and [ Ineq 2] both hold.
Proof.
(of Part 1) Part 1 of this proposition states that for a set of parameters and an arbitrary ¯  such that there
is a solution to (63) − (66) for which [ Ineq 1] and [ Ineq 2] both hold, there exists at least one pair of
initial conditions such that equilibrium time paths exhibit Malthusian balanced growth behavior in the limit.
The proof is implied by Proposition 13. The solution generated by (0 0)=
¡¯  ¯ 
¢
exhibits Malthusian
behavior from period 0 and onward, and hence, it also delivers Malthusian behavior in the limit.
Again, for most such ˆ , there is a continuum of 0 such that ˆ 
¡
0 0 = ¯ 
¢
∈ 2, but the restrictions on
such ˆ  and 0 are impossible to derive analytically.
(of Part 2) If ˆ (0 0) ∈ 2 then for  large enough, say  ∗, the economy approximately exhibits the
properties of a Malthus BGP, i.e. equations (59)−(62) have an admissible solution     and [ Ineq 2]
holds either with = or with . Indeed, if [ Ineq 2] did not hold, for  large enough, Solow sector would
operate. Now pick any arbitrary ¯  ∗ and let ¯  = ¯ 
¯  Note that ¯  is unaﬀected by the choice of ¯  ∗









 ¯  = ¯  solve (63) −(66) and satisfy
[ Ineq 1] and [ Ineq 2] It is easily veriﬁed. (See Corollary 14).
7Notice ¯  inﬂuences ¯  and ¯  as well as [ Ineq 1]
25Proposition 16 For a given ˆ  there may exist multiple pairs (0 0) such that ˆ  (0 0) ∈ ∗
2.
Proof. This is true because the system (63)−(66) together with [ Ineq 1] and [ Ineq 2] can have more
than one solution. Consider the following ˆ  as an example:  =0 4=0 2=0 03=0 71147 Λ =1 
 =0 486=1  1 = 100 2 = 100=0 451=0 259=0 6706 1 =1 3845 2 =1 1165 Then
(0 0)=( 1 549 000202) and (0 0)=( 1 86925 0001) both belong to ∗
2.
4.1.5 Comparative Statics Results for the Malthus BGP
• First we show that 
1  0 (=0 when  =1 ).
I n d e e d ,w ec a nr e w r i t ee q u a t i o n s(59) − (62) as
1−1 = 1−−




 − (1 − )
´
Ã 
 − (1 − )






 − (1 − ) and  = 










− (1 − )
³






































 − (1 − )
!
⎞






The above equation implicitly deﬁnes .N o t et h a ti f =1 is independent of  so in that case 
1 =0 
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⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
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 − (1 − )
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1− − (1 − ) could



















so subtracting something less than 1 from 1










Note that 1−  0 because this is labor supply per adult. It is clear from the above equation that 
1  0
Otherwise, we would have a negative LHS but a positive RHS.




1− and we already showed that 
1  0 we have

1  0 
• We also have 























 − (1 − )
!
⎞











− (1 − )







Recall that the second term of the product on the LHS is positive. This means that both (1 − ) and
(− ) are positive. (Indeed, both of these expressions being negative would imply 1   a contra-
diction). Suppose contrary to the claim, we have 
  0.T h e na s increases,  also increases. Then unam-








































 − (1 − )
!
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(1 − )(1− )
+
 0




1− and we already showed that 
  0 we also have

  0 (As
survival probability increases,  declines, population growth rate rises, dampening economic growth.
274.1.6 Derivation and discussion of Solow balanced growth properties
Recall from Lemma 2 that it is always optimal to operate the Malthusian technology. This means that a
Solow balanced growth path can only emerge asymptotically, with the Malthusian output relative to the
total converging to zero, as deﬁned in 3. In order to have a discussion and derive equations describing
Solow balanced growth, we eliminate the Malthusian technology from existence by setting 1 =0for all
 In such a system, there is only one state variable, . Initial condition 0 only determines population
dynamics. Optimal per capita variables are independent of {}
∞
=0 
Proposition 17 Consider a version of our model with 1 =0  ∀. If there is a solution {   }
∞
=0
such that all variables grow at constant rates, say  then the following is true.
(1)  =  =  ≡ 
(2) The unknowns  (where  = 





 =  ( +1− ) (76)





= −  (77)
 +  =


+( 1− ) (78)











with  and  given by (75) − (78) are in steady state for all  (which we denote by a bar), ¯ ¯ 0 and












1 −  − 

¶
¯  =( 1 − )20¯  (1 − )
− (− ) (81)
¯  + ¯  = 20¯  (1 − )
1− +( 1− )¯  (82)
(4) Initial condition 0 generating such a solution correspond to ¯ 
Proof. The proposed solution must allocate zero resources to the Malthusian sector, 1 =0(because






(+1 +1− ) (83)






 + +1 = 20
2
 (1 − )




 (1 − )
1−  (86)
 =( 1 − )20
2
 (1 − )
−  (87)
From the ﬁrst equation, which becomes  =

 [+1 +1− ] on a BGP, we see that  must remain constant,





28Since output can be rewritten as 




  (1 − )
1− = 
  we have  =  Next
we want to show that  and  must grow at the same constant rate. Consider (85) rewritten using the
deﬁnition of 













The right hand side is a constant, hence, the left hand side must also remain constant, denote it by  = 

So,  and  must grow at the same rate too. Hence, using (88) we have




Further, from the second equation (84) it is seen that  and  must grow at the same rate.
Note that output can also be rewritten as either 
 or






 (1 − )
− (1 − )=
 (1 − )
1 − 

i.e., we can solve for  in terms of  We obtain  =
(1−)










which mean that (84) can be written as






Hence, we obtain a system of four equations (75) − (78) in four unknowns . So far we proved parts
1a n d2o ft h ep r o p o s i t i o n .
















































































Whenever the original variables are on a Solow BGP, the eﬃciency variables are in steady state. This is true
by construction of eﬃciency variables that used information on  and  determined in (75) − (78) Hence,
the above system must hold when we replace the eﬃciency variables by their constant steady state values,
denoted by a bar. The above equations then simplify to (80)−(82) Equation (79) holds because we showed
that equation (75) must hold. We also have that ¯ ¯  correspond to 0 0 respectively. Because the original
variables, 0 and 0 are positive, we also have ¯  ¯ 0
Proposition 18 Consider a version of our model with 1 =0  ∀.I f ˆ  ∈ Θ is such that the system of
equations (79) − (82) has a solution   ¯  ¯  such that ¯  ¯ 0,t h e n(0 0) where 0 = ¯  and 0 is
any positive real number generates the solution exhibiting Solow balanced growth behavior from period 0 and
onward.
29Proof. This proposition assumes that ˆ  is such that an admissible solution to the steady state values of
eﬃciency variables that correspond to a Solow BGP (in an economy without the Malthusian technology)
exists. We start the economy oﬀ at 0 = ¯  and 0 being any positive real number. Consider sequences ©
 = ¯   =¯   = 0ª∞
=0 as a candidate solution. This solution satisﬁes equations (83) − (87) ∀.
Since the assumptions of Proposition 5 hold, the transversality conditions (8) and (9) also hold. Hence, the
proposed solution satisﬁes conditions suﬃcient to be the equilibrium solution, and it exhibits Solow balanced
growth properties.
Corollary 19 (to Propositions 17 and 18)
Consider a version of our model with 1 =0  ∀. Suppose there is a solution {   }
∞
=0 such that







and ¯  = ¯  solve (79)−(82). Conversely, given a solution   ¯  ¯  to (79)−(82),
we have    = ¯ 
¯  and  = 20¯ −1 (1 − )
1− solve (75) − (78)
Proof. Straight-forward to verify.
Proposition 20 If ˆ (0 0) ∈ 3 then the system (79)−(82) has a solution ¯ ¯  such that ¯ ¯  = 0 
0.
Proof. If ˆ (0 0) ∈ 3 then for  large enough the economy approximately exhibits the properties of a
Solow, with the Malthusian sector output relative to the total converging to 0. Equations (75) − (78) then
have an admissible solution     Then the steady state levels of eﬃciency variables have an admissible
solution, as we can back these out as in Corollary 19, i.e., ˆ  ∈ Θ satisﬁes (79) − (82)
4.1.7 Comparative Statics Results for the Solow BGP
Consider a version of our model with 1 =0  ∀
• First, it is clear from (75) that

2  0 
• It is also true that 
2  0 (=0 when  =1 ).











 − (1 − )
´
Ã 
 − (1 − )

+( 1− ) − 
!
= − 












− (1 − )







Note that if  =1  the above equation deﬁnes  independently of  so in that case 
2 =0 








− (1 − )







 +  


 − (1 − )
−
(− (1 − ))(−1)
³


























− (1 − )







− (1 − )
³











 +  
















































































Note that  =







 −(1−)  1 so we have 1
 − 0 and

 − 1  0 in the above. It is then clear that 
 must be negative
for the LHS to yield a positive number.
Since

2  0 we have 
2  0
• Finally, we also have 








− (1 − )







Recall that the second term of the product on the LHS is positive. This means that both (1 − ) and
(− ) are positive. (Indeed, both of these expressions being negative would imply 1   a
contradiction). Suppose contrary to the claim, we have 
  0.T h e na s increases,  also increases. Then















− (1 − )















(− (1 − )) − (− (1 − ))
+
= −
(1 − )(1− )
+
 0
4.1.8 Summary of Balanced Growth Paths Properties and Comparative Statics Results
As discussed in the paper, equilibrium time paths may exhibit one of three possible types of limiting behavior.
It is both the parameter values and initial conditions that determine which type of behavior the equilibrium
paths will exhibit. It is instructive to present the equations determining the properties along each possible
type of balanced growth. See Bar and Leukhina (2007) for derivations, propositions and proofs.
(1) Malthus-Solow balanced growth,
1(ˆ 00)
(ˆ 00) =  ∈ (01) ∀
All per capita variables grow at the same rate,  =  = 1 =  = 1 ≡ 
31The unknowns    1    (where  = 
  = 1
   =
1





































(1 − 1 − )





Comparative statics results: 














All per capita variables grow at the same rate,  =  =  ≡  The unknowns  (where  = 
)a r e
determined by the following system of equations,
1−1 = 1−−
 =  ( +1− )



















 which ensures that employing
Solow technology is never optimal.
Comparative statics results: 
1  0 (=0 if  =1 )

1  0 




(3) Solow balanced growth,
1(ˆ 00)
(ˆ 00) ~0 Equations are derived under the assumption that 1 =0∀
All per capita variables grow at the same rate,  =  =  ≡  The unknowns  (where  = 
)a r e





 =  ( +1− )










Comparative statics results: 
2  0 (=0 if  =1 ),

2  0 




4.1.9 Segmentation of the parameter and initial conditions space
Proposition 21 ∃ˆ  ∈ Θ such that 1, 2,a n d3 are all non-empty.
8There is a unique analytical solution to this system of equations, which is derived in Bar and Leukhina (2007).
32Proof. It suﬃces to present an example. Consider the same ˆ  as in the proof of Proposition 16. Then
(0 0)=( 1 549 000202) ∈ 2, (0 0)=( 2 7 1564 0995) ∈ 3,a n d(0 0)=( 1 5 1665 00044) ∈ 1.
The initial condition then determines the limiting behavior of the equilibrium paths. For each such ˆ  that
we found, 1 coincides with ∗
1 that is, there is a unique initial condition that allows the equilibrium time
paths to exhibit Malthus-Solow BGP behavior. Refer to Figure 2. The discussion here corresponds to the
segment of ˆ  for which 3 is depicted as a smaller part. For this segment 1consists of a line.
Figure 2 roughly illustrates how the space of parameter and initial condition values may be split into
1∗
1 2∗
2 3 and other segments generating behavior omitted from the above discussion.
Figure 2. Stylized Segmentation of the Parameter and Initial Conditions Space
There is no analytical solution for the limiting growth rate of population and per capita output ( and ) in
2 and 3 The systems of equations determining  and  in 2 and 3 are given by (59)−(62) and (75)−(78)
respectively. The comparative statics results show that for both, Malthus BGP and Solow BGP, increases
in the TFP growth rate lead to a decline in the population growth rate and an increase in per capita output
growth rate. For Malthus BGPs, increases in probability of survival lead to exactly the opposite eﬀect. In
contrast, for Solow BGPs, increases in survival probabilities lead to increases in population growth but do




335 Calibration as a solution to the system of linear equations
We calibrate the model under the assumption that the English economy around 1600 is on a Malthus-Solow


















[ +1− ] (93)


















(1 − 1 − )
 (96)
 +  =


+( 1− ) (97)
where the unknowns are    1    ( = 
  = 1
   =
1
 ).
T h ei d e ai st or e w r i t et h es y s t e mo fe q u a t i o n st h a tdescribes the properties of a Malthus-Solow BGP (91)−(97)





 ) and parameters only.









(1−1−) Combine it with an algebraic identity to get
1 −  = 1 +1− 1 − 










(1 − 1 − )














(1−) Combining it with an algebraic identity we
get
 =  +( 1− )

















This allows us to get 1 and 2 and give prediction to  and  Then  =

 [ +1− ] c a nb eu s e dt o g e t h e r
with  +1−  i nt h ed a t at og e t We then use the moment  to get  + . Separately employing the
assumption on  and  we calibrate  and  Finally, we combine equations four and seven

















































and hence, the above becomes



















which pins down .
We can think of solving the last equation as solving 2 equations in two unknowns:  and .







































































 +  = 


+( 1− ) (107)
Hence calibration can be summarized as a solution to a system of linear equations. In the system of linear
equations above, 12 are directly pinned down in the data, although 1 and 2 are pinned down only
 are determined. The system of equations consists of 10 equations in terms of 10 unknowns, 7 of which
are parameters,        and 3 of which are moments that we do not take from the data: 
  








The equilibrium time paths are sequences of allocations and prices that satisfy
+1

=  (+1 +1− ) (108)
(1 −  − )+1
+1
=  [(+1 +1− ) − +1] (109)
 + +1 =  ( ;)+( 1− ) (110)
 =  − +1 (111)
where







1Λ1−− + 2 ( − 1)




s.t. 0 ≤ 1 ≤  0 ≤ 1 ≤ 
and
 = 1 ( ;)  = 2 ( ;) (113)
Notice that the time cost of raising a surviving child  as well as 1 = 10
Q
=0 1 and 2 = 20
Q
=0 2
are indexed by . The experiments that we perform involve changing {12}
=2000
=1600 in accordance with
historical data.






(+1 +1− ) (114)




=  ( )+( 1− ) (116)
 =1 −  (117)
where












+ 2 ( − 1)




s.t. 0 ≤ 1 ≤  0 ≤ 1 ≤ 
and
 = 1( )  = 2( ) (119)
Since the equilibrium time paths exhibit exponential growth, it is diﬃcult to directly search for the numerical
solution that satisﬁes the above conditions. As is commonly done in practice, we work with eﬃciency, or























 =  ∗





  = ∗





=0  =1and  and  represent the balanced growth rates of  and
 respectively that correspond to the parameters at time . For the discussion of determining the balanced
growth path growth rates for a given parameter choice see the previous section on balanced growth. The
reason why we use products of growth rates to detrend the original variables instead of powers of the original
growth rate is again the fact that changing parameters might (and actually does) lead to a change of the
36limiting growth rates. Hence, detrending the original variables by powers of the growth rates along the initial
balanced growth path will not be suﬃcient to eliminate exponential growth of the unknown time paths.



































































s.t. 0 ≤ ∗
1 ≤ ∗









































Hence, we search for equilibrium time paths of eﬃciency variables that satisfy conditions (121)−(126) using
the original steady state eﬃciency variables as the initial guess. Once the equilibrium eﬃciency variables are
obtained, we use (120) to back out the equilibrium time paths of the original variables.
7 Solving our model with the Barro and Becker parental utility
Proposition 22 Under the assumption of  = 
 +
1−
 +1 (the Barro-Becker formulation), the objec-















































































































37Just like for the case of  = log +( 1− )log + +1 the competitive equilibrium allocation for the










s.t.  + +1 =  (  − +1;)+( 1− )
 =  − +1







1Λ1−− + 2 ( − 1)




Nonnegativity, 0 0 given.
7.1 Solving the model
All of the propositions from section 5 apply here except the equations must be replaced appropriately. In
this section we derive all of the relevant equations for the case of the Barro and Becker utility.
We use the following notation for the factor prices:
 ≡ 1 (  − +1)













[+1]: = +1 (+1 +1− )




+1 =  − +1+1










 (+1 +1− )














 + +1 = 
 ( − +1)
1− +( 1− )








 =  (+1 +1− )
(1 −  − )

+1 =( +1 +1− ) − +1
 + +1 = 
 (1 − )
1− +( 1− )
Compare these conditions to the corresponding conditions for the Solow model with Lucas utility
+1

 =  (+1 +1− )
(1 −  − )

+1 =( +1 +1− ) − +1
 + +1 = 
 (1 − )
1− +( 1− )
+1

 =  (+1 +1− )
(1 −  − )

 =  −
+1
(+1 +1− )
387.2 Deriving Malthus-Solow BGP conditions
On the BGP, we have
1− =

 [+1 +1− ] (127)
(1 −  − )










2 ( − 1)
−1 (1 − 1 − )








 =( 1 − )20
2 ( − 1)
 (1 − 1 − )
− =  (130)






2 ( − 1)
 (1 − 1 − )1− +( 1− ) (131)
Note that on the BGP, 1 must grow at the same rate as  hence  = 1 must stay constant. Also
1 must stay constant, denote it by 1.F r o mt h eﬁrst equation we have  m u s tb ec o n s t a n t ,c a l li t.
1− =

 [ +1− ] (132)
(1 −  − )











 (1 − 1 − )







 =( 1 − )20
2(1 − )
 (1 − 1 − )
− =  (135)










2 (1 − )
 
(1 − 1 − )1− +( 1− ) (136)










and MP in Solow technology being constant implies 
2
−1
 must be constant,so that
2 = 1−













Further,  and  must grow at the same rate from the second equation. Denote  = 
 From feasibility
 and +1 must grow at the same rate. Denote  = 

Malthusian output can be rewritten as 1 = 1
 =

 or as 1 = 1




















39Hence, we can rewrite the second equation as








Next deﬁne  =
1






























(1 − 1 − )
Finally, we rewrite the feasibility condtion as
 + +1 =  +( 1− )





























 [ +1− ] (139)


















(1 − 1 − )
(142)
 +  =


+( 1− ) (143)
where the unknowns are    1    ( = 
  = 1
   =
1
 ).
Next solve for the steady state in detrended variables.
407.3 Calibration of the model under the assumption of the Barro and Becker
parental utility





 ) and parameters
only.










(1−1−) Combine it with an algebraic identity to get
1 −  = 1 +1− 1 − 










(1 − 1 − )














(1−) Combining it with an algebraic identity we
get
 =  +( 1− )

















This allows us to get 1 and 2 and give prediction to  and 
We then use the moment  and the newly obtained  to get +. Separately employing the assumption
on  and  we calibrate  and  Finally, we combine equations four and seven





 ( +1− )

− 1 (144)
 +  =


+( 1− ) (145)
to get







































and hence, the above becomes




















which pins down 1−−
  If we set one of them, say , then we know the other, ,f r o mt h i se q u a t i o n .W e
can think of solving the last equation as solving 2 equations in two unknowns:  and .
41Then 1− =

 [ +1− ] can be used together with  +1−  i nt h ed a t at og e t



































































 +  = 


+( 1− ) (156)
1− =

 [ +1− ] (157)
So,   1 2 (although the last two can be pinned down only after  are determined) are directly
pinned down in the data. Also,  is set.
10 equations, 10 unknowns: 7 parameters        and 3 moments that we do not take from the






We have 7 moments and 7 parameters.
8E ﬀects of TFP and Labor Supply Changes on Structural Change
8.1 Changes in Productivity
In this subsection, we analyze the eﬀect of changes in productivity on inputs allocation in a two sector
economy. In particular, we focus on the role that preferences play in determining the direction of resource
reallocation.
We describe a simple static general equilibrium model economy, with two sectors. The numeraire is good 2,









1 = 1 (1) − 1
max
2
2 = 2(2) − 2
Market clearing
[Labor mkt.]:1 + 2 =1
[Good 1]:1 = 1 (1)
[Good 2]:2 = 2(2)






2),s u c ht h a t( i )g i v e nt h ep r i c e s(∗
1 ∗
2) solves




2) solves the ﬁrms’ problems, and (iii) markets
are cleared.





1 = 1 (1)
2 = 2(2)
1 + 2 =1
If the solution is interior (∗
1 ∗








Wage can be inferred from 10 (∗
1)=,i f∗
1  0 or from 20 (∗
2)=,i f∗
2  0.
Corner solution means that only one sector is producing. Corner solution is possible if and only if two
conditions hold: (i) the utility does not satisfy Inada conditions, and (ii) at least one of the production
functions does not satisfy Inada conditions. If either the utility, or both production functions, satisfy the
Inada conditions, then we must have interior solution (∗
1 ∗
2  0). To see this, consider the Marginal Rate

















If  satisﬁes the Inada conditions, then  attains all the values between 0 and ∞, and even if the PPF is
linear, tangency occurs at an interior point of the PPF. If both production functions satisfy Inada conditions,
then the  attains all the values between 0 and ∞, and even if indiﬀerence curves are linear, a tangency
will occur at the interior of the PPF.
Example of corner solution. Suppose that (1 2)=1 + 2, thus the utility does not satisfy Inada


















. The slope of the PPF at bottom end (when 2 =0 )i s = 2
1.W eh a v eac o r n e rs o l u t i o n
with only 1 being produced if and only if 1 ≥ 2
1. This is analogous to the Malthus Only case in our
paper. The solution is interior if 1  2
1.







Substituting the production functions and the labor constraint, we have one equation with one unknown 1.
If the solution is unique, then this equation uniquely determines the labor allocation in this economy.
1 (1 (1) 2(1 − 1))
2 (1 (1) 2(1 − 1))
=
20 (1 − 1)
10 (1)
10 (1)1 (1 (1) 2(1 − 1)) − 20 (1 − 1)2 (1 (1) 2(1 − 1)) = 0




0 [1 + 111] − 2021
1 [001 + 0 · (1110 − 1220)] − 2 [−002 + 0 · (2110 − 2220)]




0 [1 + 111]
1 [001 + 0 · 1110]+2 [002 + 02220]
Even with the separability assumption, we can’t say much about the sign of 11. For instance, the
sign of the numerator depends on (1 + 111).I f1  0 and 11  0, there is no way to determine
this sign. Moreover, an important CES utility class is not separable.







The sign is always positive if production functions are strictly concave. This is the only general result that
we can obtain. Thus, with perfect substitutes, an increase in productivity in sector  will always pull the
labor to that industry.
Important. Apriori, we have no idea how to model the preferences between the two goods. However, when
we measure the TFP’s in the two sectors, we ﬁnd that the TFP in the Solow sector increased more. If we
assume that the two goods are perfect substitutes, then we guarantee that the labor will reallocate towards
the Solow sector. Notice that our estimates of TFP are independent of assumptions on preferences. Thus,
our estimates of the TFP’s impose restrictions on the kind of preferences that we need in order to generate
the sectoral transition.




1 +( 1− )

2]
1 ,  ≤ 1
1 = 1
1
1 , 0  1 ≤ 1
2 = 2
2
2 , 0  2 ≤ 1
1 + 2 =1
The elasticity of substitution between 1 and 2 is 1(1 − ). Recall that




 = −∞ Perfect complements
Assuming interior solution, we have





















































































Now we turn to the sign of Ψ1 (1 1 2).
Ψ1 = −(1 − 2)(1− 1)
−2 
1−1
1 +( 1− 1)
1−2 (1 − 1)
1−2
1  0
(2 − 1)1 +( 1− 1)(1 − 1)  0
Notice that  − 1 is always negative when 1 and 0   ≤ 1.T h u s ,t h e(11) is determined














When the two goods are complements (it is hard to substitute manufacturing goods for food), we must have
a push eﬀect of productivity in a sector on the labor allocated to that sector. If the goods are substitutes,
there is a pull eﬀect of productivity in a sector on the labor allocated to that sector. If the utility is Cobb-
Douglas, labor allocation between the two sectors is independent of the productivities in the two sectors.
The next ﬁgure shows the labor allocation for 1 = 2 =0 5 and 3 cases of elasticity of substitution:  =0 5,
















8.1.2 Stone-Geary utility, Cobb-Douglas production
Suppose that
(1 2)=ln(1 − ˜ 1)+( 1− )ln(2 − ˜ 2), ˜ 1˜ 2 ≥ 0
1 = 1
1
1 , 0  1 ≤ 1
2 = 2
2
2 , 0  2 ≤ 1
1 + 2 =1






2 − ˜ 2












2 (1 − 1)
2 − ˜ 2
1
1
















2 (1 − 1)
2 − ˜ 2
















2 (1 − 1)
2
2 (1 − 1)
2−1 −
˜ 2
























1 − 1 −







































































































First we show that Ψ1 is always negative.

































Consider and upper bound on Ψ1 when 1 & ˜ 1 and 2 & ˜ 2. We show that this upper bound is always
negative.

















2 (1 − 1) − 2
1
+
(1 − 2) − 
1 − 
=
2 (1 − 1) − 2
1
+
(1 − 2) − 
1 − 
=
2 − 12 − 2
1
+







Ψ2  0 if ˜ 1  0










if ˜ 1  0
if ˜ 1 =0
To summarize the results, the presence of minimum consumption requirement in industry  creates a push
eﬀect of productivity growth on labor employed in that sector. This means that if only one good has minimum
consumption requirement, then an increase in that sector’s productivity will push the labor away from that
sector. An increase in productivity of a sector which does not have minimum consumption requirement,
does not have any eﬀect on labor allocation between the two sectors. To convince yourself, observe equation
(159) which determines the allocation of labor between the two sectors. If ˜ 1 =0 ,t h e n1 does not have
any eﬀect of labor allocation between the two sectors. If ˜ 2 =0 ,t h e n2 does not have any eﬀect of labor
allocation between the two sectors. Interestingly, if both goods have minimum consumption requirement
and both productivities go up, then labor allocation can change in either direction





1 , 0  1 ≤ 1
2 = 2
2
2 , 0  2 ≤ 1
1 + 2 =1










































It is clear even without taking derivatives, that an increase in 2 leads to lower 1, i.e. higher 2.J u s ti n
case, let










−(1 − 2)(1− 1)
1−2 
−1





To summarize, 1 does not have any eﬀect on labor allocation, while 2 has a pull eﬀect, i.e. higher
productivity in sector 2 attracts labor into that sector.
8.1.4 Intuition
In this section we are trying to ﬁnd out what features of preferences determines whether we have a push eﬀect
or pull eﬀect. One might suspect that the elasticity of substitution is the one property responsible for the
direction of resource allocation due to productivity changes. This intuition turns out to be correct in most
47cases, but not always. In the CES utility, indeed, when the two goods are substitutes there is a pull eﬀect
and when they are complements there is a push eﬀect. However, with non-constant elasticity, this does not
have to happen. For example, in the Stone-Geary or quasi-linear utility cases, sometimes productivity does
not have any eﬀect on labor allocation. However, when productivity does have eﬀect on labor allocation,
the direction of the eﬀect is consistent with economic intuition and the results obtained in the CES case.






































Thus, in the quasi-linear utility case, the two goods are always substitutes.H o w e v e r ,t h ee ﬀects of changes
in productivity are totally diﬀerent from the CES case. Recall that in the CES case, when the two goods
are substitutes, both 1 ↑ and 2 ↑ have pull eﬀect on labor allocated to their corresponding sectors. In the
quasi-linear case however 1 ↑ has no eﬀect and 2 ↑ has a pull eﬀect.





























2 − ˜ 2















2 − ˜ 2






























(2−˜ 2) − 1
i
48Use the fact that  = −21,t h a ti s , i st h en e g a t i v eo ft h es l o p eo fi n d i ﬀerence curves, gives
 =


























































=( 1 − )
µ









Thus, in the Stone-Geary utility case, the two goods are always complements. As our analysis above shows,
the presence of a positive minimum consumption requirement in a sector implies a push eﬀect of productivity
increase on labor in that sector. However, if a sector does not have minimum consumption requirement,
then changing productivity in that sector will not have any eﬀect on labor allocation in the economy.
The next table summarizes the main ﬁndings. The arrows ↑ and ↓ indicate an increase or decrease in a
variable, while a bar on top of a variable indicates that the variable remains unchanged.





0 ≤ 1 1
 =0 =1
0 1
1 ↑ 2 ↓
¯ 1 ¯ 2
1 ↓ 2 ↑
1 ↓ 2 ↑
¯ 1 ¯ 2
1 ↑ 2 ↓
Stone-Geary always complements
˜ 1  0 ˜ 2 =0
˜ 1 =0  ˜ 2  0
˜ 1  0 ˜ 2  0
1 ↓ 2 ↑
¯ 1 ¯ 2
1 ↓ 2 ↑
¯ 1 ¯ 2
1 ↑ 2 ↓




¯ 1 ¯ 2
1 ↑ 2 ↓
1 ↓ 2 ↑
¯ 1 ¯ 2
From the examples we analyzed above, we see that sometimes, changes in productivity of a sector does not
have any eﬀect on labor allocation between the two sectors. However, when change in productivity does
have an eﬀect, this eﬀect is consistent with the basic economic intuition: (i) if goods are complements,h i g h e r
productivity in a sector will have a push eﬀect on labor in that sector, to allow higher production of the
other good, and (ii) if the goods are substitutes, higher productivity has a pull eﬀect, to lower production in
the other sector.
8.2 Changes in Total Labor Endowment
In this section we analyze the eﬀect of a change in total labor endowment on inputs allocation across sectors.
In particular, we focus on the role that preferences play in determining the direction of resource reallocation.
As before, we assume interior solution to begin with, i.e. both sectors operate. The labor allocation across








1 = 1 (1)
2 = 2(2)
1 + 2 = 
where  is total labor.




1 +( 1− )

2]
1 ,  ≤ 1
1 = 1
1
1 , 0  1 ≤ 1
2 = 2
2
2 , 0  2 ≤ 1
1 + 2 = 
In this setup, we are interested in the signs of: (i) 1, and (ii) ,w h e r e = 1 is the fraction
of labor in sector 1. Assuming interior solution, we have

























































































The sign of Ψ2 is always positive when 1 and 0  2 ≤ 1.
Ψ2 =






Now we turn to the sign of Ψ1
Ψ1 = −(1 − 2)(1− 1)
−2 
1−1
1 +( 1− 1)
1−2 (1 − 1)
1−2
1  0
(2 − 1)1 +( 1− 1)(1 − 1)  0
Which is always negative if 1 and 0   ≤ 1.T h u s ,1  0 and by symmetry 2  0.I n
other words, an increase in total labor, increases the labor input in both sectors.
Now we ask what happens to the fraction of labor employed in each sector when total labor input goes up.


































50Notice that Ψ1 is always negative if 1 and 0   ≤ 1, so the sign of  is the same as the sign of








if [0, 1  2] or [0, 1  2]
if  =0or 1 = 2
if [0, 1  2] or [0, 1  2]
We see that there are two cases where increasing labor endowment does not aﬀect the fraction of labor
employed in each sector. The ﬁrst case is  =0 , i.e. Cobb-Douglas preferences, and the second case is
1 = 2, i.e. when the labor share in both sectors is the same. Consider now the case of 1  2.B o t h
sector exhibit diminishing marginal returns to labor, but the sector with the higher  less so. If the goods
are substitutes, 0, and the labor endowment goes up, it is eﬃcient to allocate more of the extra labor
to the sector that "suﬀers less" from diminishing marginal returns. On the other hand, when the goods are
complements, 0, the consumer wants to increase or decrease the consumption of both goods together.
In this case, a greater fraction of the extra labor in the economy would be allocated towards the sector
with smaller . One can think of the sector with smaller  as the "weaker" sector because the returns to
labor diminish faster. If the goods are complements, and the consumer wants to increase their consumption
together, then the "weaker" sector "needs" more of the additional labor. When the goods are substitutes,
greater portion of the extra labor goes to the "strong" sector.
8.2.2 Stone-Geary utility, Cobb-Douglas production
Suppose that
(1 2)=ln(1 − ˜ 1)+( 1− )ln(2 − ˜ 2), ˜ 1˜ 2 ≥ 0
1 = 1
1
1 , 0  1 ≤ 1
2 = 2
2
2 , 0  2 ≤ 1
1 + 2 = 






2 − ˜ 2












2 ( − 1)
2 − ˜ 2
1
1















2 ( − 1)
2 − ˜ 2
















 − 1 −










































































































































This means that an increase in labor endowment will increase the labor allocation to sector 1, and by
symmetry to sector 2 as well.
More important is to ﬁnd out what happens to the fraction of labor employed in each sector, when total


































































































































































































































if ˜ 2  0 and ˜ 1 =0
if ˜ 2 =0and ˜ 1 =0
if ˜ 2 =0and ˜ 1  0
It is more diﬃculty to ﬁnd out what happens to  when both ˜ 2  0 and ˜ 1  0.





1 , 0  1 ≤ 1
2 = 2
2
2 , 0  2 ≤ 1
1 + 2 = 









































This means that an increase in the labor endowment will increase the labor allocated to sector 1. Similarly,












Thus, an increase in labor endowment increases the labor employed in each sector. More interestingly, we
would like to know what happens to the fraction of labor employed in each sector as a result of an increase























This means that higher labor endowment will push the labor towards the sector that produces the good with
constant marginal utility.
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